The year is 1787. America is a fledgling confederation of 13 colonies. A new Constitution has been written in Philadelphia, to replace the Articles of Confederation. Do you think that this new constitution should become the supreme law of the land?
Vote: YES or NO
The Federalists want you to vote yes. As America roils with intense debate on this fateful issue, a series of essays begin to appear in three New York newspapers, written by the mysterious persona Publius. These essays urge the American people to ratify the constitution, explaining and defending it in detail. After their debut in New York, the essays subsequently appear in newspapers across the nation.
We know today that Publius was actually three different people: Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison. Their painstaking efforts to explain and promote the United States Constitution have become a primary source for the interpretation and understanding of the highest law of the United States of America.
Thomas Jefferson called the Federalist Papers the “best commentary on the principles of government which ever was written.”
They are available in their entirety on this site, as audio narrations. Direct links to each essay are provided below. They can also be accessed as an RSS feed, and as an iTunes podcast. All together, these narrations comprise 21 hours 36 minutes of audio, and total 756.9 MB.
Federalist Papers iTunes podcast
Direct links to the essays:
Federalist No. 1
General Introduction
Federalist No. 2
Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
Federalist No. 3
Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence, Continued
Federalist No. 4
Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence, Continued
Federalist No. 5
Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence, Continued
Federalist No. 6
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
Federalist No. 7
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States, Continued
Federalist No. 8
The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
Federalist No. 9
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
Federalist No. 10
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection, Continued
Federalist No. 11
The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
Federalist No. 12
The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
Federalist No. 13
Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
Federalist No. 14
Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
Federalist No. 15
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
Federalist No. 16
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union, Continued
Federalist No. 17
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union, Continued
Federalist No. 18
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union, Continued
Federalist No. 19
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union, Continued
Federalist No. 20
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union, Continued
Federalist No. 21
Other Defects of the Present Confederation
Federalist No. 22
Other Defects of the Present Confederation, Continued
Federalist No. 23
The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
Federalist No. 24
The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
Federalist No. 25
The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered, Continued
Federalist No. 26
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
Federalist No. 27
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered, Continued
Federalist No. 28
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered, Continued
Federalist No. 29
Concerning the Militia
Federalist No. 30
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
Federalist No. 31
Concerning the General Power of Taxation, Continued
Federalist No. 32
Concerning the General Power of Taxation, Continued
Federalist No. 33
Concerning the General Power of Taxation, Continued
Federalist No. 34
Concerning the General Power of Taxation, Continued
Federalist No. 35
Concerning the General Power of Taxation, Continued
Federalist No. 36
Concerning the General Power of Taxation, Continued
Federalist No. 37
Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
Federalist No. 38
The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
Federalist No. 39
The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
Federalist No. 40
The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
Federalist No. 41
General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
Federalist No. 42
The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
Federalist No. 43
The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered, Continued
Federalist No. 44
Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
Federalist No. 45
The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
Federalist No. 46
The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
Federalist No. 47
The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
Federalist No. 48
These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
Federalist No. 49
Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
Federalist No. 50
Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
Federalist No. 51
The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
Federalist No. 52
The House of Representatives
Federalist No. 53
The House of Representatives, Continued
Federalist No. 54
The Apportionment of Members Among the States
Federalist No. 55
The Total Number of the House of Representatives
Federalist No. 56
The Total Number of the House of Representatives, Continued
Federalist No. 57
The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
Federalist No. 58
Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
Federalist No. 59
Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
Federalist No. 60
Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members, Continued
Federalist No. 61
Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members, Continued
Federalist No. 62
The Senate
Federalist No. 63
The Senate Continued
Federalist No. 64
The Powers of the Senate
Federalist No. 65
The Powers of the Senate Continued
Federalist No. 66
Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
Federalist No. 67
The Executive Department
Federalist No. 68
The Mode of Electing the President
Federalist No. 69
The Real Character of the Executive
Federalist No. 70
The Executive Department Further Considered
Federalist No. 71
The Duration in Office of the Executive
Federalist No. 72
The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
Federalist No. 73
The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
Federalist No. 74
The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
Federalist No. 75
The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
Federalist No. 76
The Appointing Power of the Executive
Federalist No. 77
The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
Federalist No. 78
The Judiciary Department
Federalist No. 79
The Judiciary Department Continued
Federalist No. 80
The Powers of the Judiciary
Federalist No. 81
The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
Federalist No. 82
The Judiciary Continued
Federalist No. 83
The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
Federalist No. 84
Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered
Federalist No. 85
Concluding Remarks
